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latter half  of  the twentieth century criminal organizations from Corsica managed to create 
networks of  power and business which penetrated and partly influenced the French economic 
and political system. Even if  these events never clearly pointed to the existence of  structural 
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the Corsican milieu laid the foundations for the development of  a transnational network—built 
on family ties and customary allegiances—able to spread throughout the whole French Empire. 
In Africa in particular, these racketeers found a fertile ground for their activities. Building on 
these premises, this article aims to analyse to what extent Corsican criminal organizations 
shaped the evolving relations between France and its former African colonies. In the existing 
literature, the term FrançAfrique designates a form of  neocolonial dominion based on personal 
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article we show that this informal system of  power created a hierarchical relation of  
dependence, where private/corporate and national interests are mixed and blurred, and actors 
such as Corsican gangsters are contemporarily criminal entrepreneurs, informal state agents, 
and gatekeepers, influencing perceptions and interests of  both French and African decision-
makers. In this sense, the Corsican milieu is a crucial case, yet largely underexplored, for 
exploring how practices and forms of  control employed in informal/illegal domains can 
influence and redefine states’ interactions and chains of  authority in low-institutionalized 
contexts.   
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Introduction 
 
The basic form of domination is the racket 
Horkheimer, 1985: 287 
 
In the last few years there has been a growing interest in the role of non-state actors, 
including criminal networks, in foreign policy. However, questions remain with respect 
to the type of benefits and challenges that states face when involving criminal 
organisations in their international behaviour. Specifically, current analyses largely 
overlook the power dynamics at play in the process of stabilisation of these types of ties. 
It is still surprising, for instance, that the way France has historically encouraged and 
benefitted from the stabilisation of informal networks of powers between local actors 
and criminal organisations has been under-addressed. In particular, this article argues 
that the formation and evolution of so called FrançAfrique should be considered as a case 
in point for shedding light on different and entangled dynamics shaping foreign policy 
and transnational power relations. In this sense, this article aims to make an initial—
and preliminary—contribution, inviting the academic community to investigate the 
somewhat neglected role played by criminal actors within the system of informal 
domination and unequal exchange that characterises the relationship between France 
and its former African colonies. More precisely, different events and criminal affairs that 
have punctuated French political life since the end of the colonial era seem to suggest 
the existence of an integrated system of co-management, involving French officials, 
African elites and members of the so-called Corsican “Mafia”, with the latter acting as 
informal agents of the French state. The interactions among these actors have created a 
complex but flexible network, which has partly structured and shaped France’s policies 
towards its former colonies, influencing at the same time the institutional development 
and the governmental capacities of the African states. On these premises, we propose to 
understand the involvement of Corsican criminal actors in the French foreign policy 
towards Africa as a racket system (Granter, 2017) revealing forms of political control 
based on the personal interactions and illicit business.  
 While the term “Corsican Mafia” is in some ways improper, as it tends to suggest 
a strong similarity between Corsican criminal organisations and the Sicilian Cosa Nostra, 
there is still a certain lack of agreement among scholars, practitioners and investigative 
journalists on the subject. Nonetheless, is it known that at the moment of the 
establishment of the Fifth Republic (1958), a few Corsican families dominated the 
international heroin trade, leading American investigators to evoke the existence of a 
“Union Corse” based on the model of the American Cosa Nostra. Although the 
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hypothesis of the existence of a Union Corse has never been demonstrated and must 
therefore be discarded (Follorou, 2004), we will note that in the case of the Guerini 
brothers, whose gang could be considered retrospectively as a “minor mafia”1, corsitude, 
that is, the feeling of common belonging to the Corsican people, seems to play an 
important role in the recruitment of associates and in the constitution of each clan’s 
social capital. With these examples, we identify the “Corsican mafia” as the aggregation 
of criminal families which, while not bound by rituals of affiliation or by bureaucratic 
instances for the division of territories to be controlled, succeed in regulating certain 
illicit markets (first prostitution, and later heroin) on which they provide forms of 
“private protection” (Gambetta, 1996), thanks to their capacity to use violence and to 
the social capital built on the experience shared with numerous public policy makers of 
resistance and/or migration. 
Although these families progressively disappeared during the 1980s, some of 
their associates remained active in Africa, where they continued to operate at least until 
the 2000s. The case of Michel Tomi and Robert Feliciaggi, which we will outline in the 
course of this article, also seems to allow a “surprising” connection between the older 
generation that disappeared in the 1980s, the next, which remained in Corsica and 
disappeared during the 2000s following a bloody war between gangs, and the latest 
generation, among whom we can find former nationalist militants who have converted 
the skills accumulated in clandestinity to the profit of their own personal interest, as 
shown by the case of the enterprises owned by Charles Pieri in the early 2000s (Briquet, 
2008).  
Hence, by analysing the case of the economic and political involvement of the 
Corsican “Mafia” in Africa as an overextension of French foreign policy, this article 
makes two contributions to the existing literature: first, theoretically, it builds bridges 
between “racket theory”, as elaborated by the Critical Theorists of the Frankfurt School 
(Stirk, 1992; Heins, 2007; Brocling, 2014) and scholarship on Foreign Policy Analysis 
(FPA) focusing on non-state actors (NSAs) (Baumann and Stengel, 2014). Second, 
empirically, it provides a first systematic account of the integration of some exponents 
of the Corsican criminal underworld within a system of power and governance that until 
recently was directed by prominent members of French officialdom. In particular, in this 
article we focus our attention on key episodes of French post-colonial politics, trying to 
sketch the formation and development of what we call a “CorsAfrique”, meaning a (sub-
                                                            
1 The concept of  “minor mafia” is enforced by the latest jurisprudence of  the Italian Court of  Cassation to 
prosecute those criminal groups which, even though they do not present the characteristics of  the so-called 
“historical mafias”, fill the requirements formulated by Article 416 bis of  the Italian Penal Code. The latter 
stipulates that the criminal association is of  the mafia type when its members, thanks to the associative tie, succeed 
in imposing relations of  silence, intimidation and subjugation in the context in which they operate. 
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)system of domination over former colonies based on personal connection between 
French politicians and personalities of the Corsican underworld.  
In order to do so, the paper unfolds as follows. In the first part we introduce the 
academic debate concerning the roles of different non-state actors in foreign policy, so 
as to show where our contribution aims to be situated. Here, by referring to “racket 
theory”, we introduce an innovative framework for studying the role of non-state 
criminal actors in foreign policy, suggesting that they can be treated as a structural 
component of a wider system of domination and power exchange driven by state 
representatives. In the second part, we set the scene for the questions addressed in the 
article by describing the inception and functioning of FrançAfrique. In particular, we 
underline the informal and personalised nature of the exchanges ruling the relations 
between France and its former colonies, claiming that they form the ideal context for 
the co-optation of grey, or even criminal, actors. The subsequent section devotes its 
attention to CorsAfrique, focusing in particular on those actors, such as Charles Pasqua, 
Nicolas Sarkozy, Michel Tomi and Robert Feliciaggi, who shaped and perpetuated the 
Franco-Corsican-African system during a period of transition that started in the early 
1990s. Finally, in the conclusion, after recapitulating the main argument and 
contributions of the paper, we propose future avenues for research. Specifically, we make 
a plea to other scholars and researchers to contribute to our research agenda by 
investigating this crucial and understudied case.   
 
Criminal Organizations as Non-State Actors in Foreign Policy:  
A State “Racket”? 
 
Non-state actors and foreign policy 
 
As is well known, for a long time traditional theories of International Relations (IR) 
disregarded the role of non-state actors, and the interactions between governmental and 
informal networks in international politics. However, Keohane and Nye’s work on 
transnationalism (1973) opened up a new research agenda that focused on NSAs and the 
analysis of transnational relations and sub-national dynamics (Zangl and Zurn, 1999; 
Risse, 2002). So far, extensive research has been conducted on the problems and 
implications of NSAs’ involvement in political affairs and different fields of governance 
(Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992; Liebfred and Zurn, 2005) both at the national level (Aran, 
2011) and international level (Yi-Chong and Weller, 2007; Baumann and Stengel, 2014). 
More interestingly, driven by an interest in disaggregating states’ behaviour in the 
international arena, Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) today offers theoretical and 
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methodological approaches that are better suited to account for the role of sub-national 
networks (see Potter, 2010; Hudson, 2013).  
Scholarly debates on NSAs in foreign policy have progressively developed 
interest in two interrelated questions. The first is the question of “governance”, 
meaning dynamics of power and responsibility-sharing between different levels of 
management, involving state and non-state actors on the same issue (Held and Koenig-
Archibugi, 2003; Dingwerth and Pattberg, 2006; Ougaard and Leander, 2010; 
Marchetti, 2016). Specifically, the main idea underlying the concept of “governance” is 
that individual states are essentially less prepared to manage and solve problems on 
their own, especially when operating in foreign countries (Reinicke, 1999; Mayntz, 
2002; Stone, 2008). To this, a second question was soon associated, namely how to make 
sense and account for the relationships between public transnational actors and private 
ones within multilevel governance, and the degree of authority they both exercise (Hall 
and Biersteker, 2002; Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Pauly and Grande, 2005; Barnett 
and Sikkink, 2008; Genschel and Zangl, 2014; Zürn et al., 2012).  
The question of NSAs in foreign policy is interesting also when considering the 
diverse nature of the actors involved. Both institutional and other types of NSAs have 
started occupying a relevant role for policy makers and academics alike, such as lobbies 
(Jacobs and Page, 2005), international judges (Madsen, 2014), ethnic (Haney and 
Vanderbush, 1999) and religious (Haynes, 2001) organisations, as well as social 
movements, whose role has received increasing attention in the recent literature 
(Hanegraaff et al., 2015; Tarrow, 2011; Catanzaro and Coticchia, 2018). Furthermore, 
the way states have used private organisations and companies in wars or to control 
foreign territories and regions of potential interest has also received attention (Singer, 
2005; Baumann and Stengel, 2014; Cusumano and Kinsey, 2015; Stanley, 2015). On this, 
Bigo insists, it would be useful to develop “a socio-historical analysis revealing the 
practices through which governors have been able to exclude private entrepreneurs of 
violence from their territory and their legitimacy after having used them for their 
conquests” (2003: 2).   
It therefore seems to be the case that a focus on the interactions between states 
and non-state actors in the international arena is not only consistent with the 
expectations and concerns of the existing academic debate, but also leaves additional 
room for analysis when taking into account power relations and dynamics of control of 
foreign territories.  
 
Cooperation with Criminal Organizations in Foreign Policy:  
The French “State Racket” 
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Regarding the nature of NSAs involved in foreign policy activities, many cases show 
that states have not relied solely on legitimate and legal actors. On the contrary, 
numerous states have often relied on criminal organisations in the implementation of 
their interests in foreign policy, ranging from informal contacts to deep-rooted 
relationships. Criminal organisations, especially when operating as businesses 
(Gambetta, 1996; Schloenhardt, 1999), might be seen to embody the “underworld as 
servant” (Pierce, 1976: 124).  
Building on the interest in state-criminal organisation relations in foreign policy, 
but going beyond this, we draw specifically on the Frankfurt School’s2 “racket theory” 
(Stirk, 1992; Heins, 2007; Granter, 2017) to make sense of the French informal approach 
to the management of political dynamics in former colonies through the Corsican 
“Mafia”. In fact, by drawing on the concept of “hidden connections” (Horkheimer, 2002; 
Adorno, 2005), racket theory highlights: 
 
[the theory] characterizes social interest groups as rival “racketeers.” They protect their 
members but demand unconditional subservience. In struggles for shares of the wealth, 
which are more or less openly conducted, they strive for the maintenance and increase of 
their living standards, as well as for social dominance, and they divide social influence and 
increase of their living standards, as well as for social dominance, and they divide social 
influence antagonistically among themselves (Schweppenhauser, 2009: 61).  
 
Granter (2017: 108), for instance, by relying on the concept of rackets to draw parallels 
between the business/corporate world and the criminal one, found that: 
 
Rather than episodic cases of politicians colluding with corporations to further their 
own interests, it is the case that the political-corporate nexus parallels the criminal-
corporate nexus in that the abuse of power is built into the dynamics of the system. 
In the context of business and politics, it is the politician, rather than the gangster, 
who functions as patron and intermediary.  
 
Hence, through the concept of racket, it is possible to bring together, and account for, 
three levels of analysis: the political sphere, criminal organisations and business 
interests. On these premises, we make the argument that through FrançAfrique, France 
installed a series of informal systems of power generating a hierarchical relation of 
dependence. More interestingly, private/corporate and national interests became mixed 
and blurred, and non-state actors such as the Corsican gangsters became simultaneously 
criminal entrepreneurs, informal state agents and gatekeepers, entering in relation with 
                                                            
2 For a detailed analysis of  Critical Theory and questions of  praxis, see Giacchetti Ludovisi (2016). 
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both French and African decision-makers. Hence, we expect to shed light on the “murky 
connections” (Adorno, 2005: 23) between French policy-makers and Corsican mobsters, 
who developed a functional transnational network, built on stable personal ties and 
customary allegiances, to exercise control over African territories of interest during and 
after colonial occupation.  
In fact, we argue, the Corsican milieu represents a potentially crucial, yet 
understudied, case for exploring how practices and forms of control employed in 
informal/illegal domains can influence and redefine states’ interactions and chains of 
authority in low-institutionalized contexts.    
 
Keeping the rois nègres under French rule: the grey world of FrançAfrique 
 
Relations between France and its former African colonies – which formed the so-called 
French pré-carré on the continent – were structured during the decolonization period, 
and strongly influenced by interests and strategies identified by first President of the 
French Fifth Republic, Charles De Gaulle, and his inner circle (Dalloz, 2014; Merle, 
1979; Vaïsse, 2009). According to the Gaullist vision of world politics, maintaining a 
“special relationship” with the African continent would be crucial to protect the 
international role of France, especially during the period of bipolar competition 
(Charillon, 2011). In particular, African allies would provide three main assets: 1) a pro-
France critical mass within the United Nations and other international fora; 2) favoured 
access to strategic mineral and energy resources and a preferential market for French 
enterprises; and 3) an area of diplomatic, political and cultural influence, useful for 
supporting France’s role in international affairs. For its part, France would guarantee 
the survival of loyal regimes through political, economic and military support (Banégas, 
Marchal and Meimon, 2007; Vaïsse, 2009). On this basis, De Gaulle’s Franco-African 
relationship was based on three main axes, namely economic and cultural penetration, 
military presence, and personal and direct exchanges among elites.3 
The combination of these three conditions generated a specific system of informal 
domination and a peculiar form of foreign policy, popularised under the name 
FrançAfrique. During a famous trial for offense toward a foreign state leader which took 
place in 2001, opposing François-Xavier Verschave, activist and president of the French 
                                                            
3 It is worth considering here that even if  things have changed significantly since General De Gaulle’s era, and 
Franco-African relations have passed through various crises (Chafer, 2002; Banégas, Marchal and Meimon, 2007), 
the strategic thought inspiring French policies towards Africa has maintained its essential features. A similar claim 
can be made concerning the French favoured axes of  action, influence and intervention on the continent (see for 
example Leboeuf  and Quénot-Suarez, 2014).  
 Baldaro, D’Amoto & Giuriati – CorsAfrique               43 
 
 
NGO Survie,4 against Omar Bongo (President of Gabon at the time), Denis Sassou-
Nguesso (President of the Republic of Congo) and Idriss Déby (President of Chad), 
Jean-François Médard, scholar and expert of African politics, described FrançAfrique as 
follows: 
 
[T]he relations between France and its former colonies are different compared 
to the typical relations between states. We can talk about Franco-African 
clientelism in a double way, firstly looking at the nature of the exchange, and 
then considering the personalization of this exchange. It is an exchange among 
unequals, presenting on the one hand a principal owning critical resources for 
his client, and on the other hand a client, who inversely needs this principal for 
his own survival. All exchanges are created on this basis. The French and the 
African states are inserted within this framework of interpersonal relations 
which link together members of the ruling class and the elites of our countries, 
both political and economic. [...] All of FrançAfrique has been established on 
relations of friendship, leading to social exchanges between our ruling classes. I 
think its main characteristic is the fusion of different domains, through personal, 
private [...] but also public exchanges (Verschave and Beccaria, 2001: 294-95, 
authors’ translation). 
 
This description of FrançAfrique captures some of the main elements which 
characterised the relationship between France and its former African colonies. With 
regard to the context where Franco-African relations developed, some “vestiges” of the 
empire persisted (Barrios, 2010), and strongly influenced the institutional environment 
of FrançAfrique. On the one hand, France pursued a policy aimed at maintaining and 
reinforcing strong cultural ties with former colonies, epitomized by the creation of the 
International Organisation of Francophonie in 1970. This initiative was both a tool for 
diffusing French “soft power”, and for furthering a process of political socialisation of 
African elites mediated by French values and preferences (Hibou, 1995; Vaïsse, 2009). 
On the other hand, economic relations followed a path already fixed during the colonial 
epoch. As suggested by various authors, Africa was historically a residual market for the 
more dynamic components of French capitalism (Marseille, 1984; Hugon, 2007). By 
exploiting public financing and different forms of state protectionism, Africa became a 
niche for relatively few French enterprises pursuing rentier, extractive, and eventually 
predatory economic activities (Hibou, 1995; Hugon, 2007). This structure of unequal 
economic exchange was preserved even after decolonization, mainly through the 
continuing presence of some French enterprises able to create direct connections with 
                                                            
4 Survie is a French NGO created in 1984, whose principal aim is to fight corruption in Africa and more widely in 
the Global South. The organisation is generally recognised as one of  the actors most engaged in monitoring and 
denouncing French policies towards African countries.   
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African elites and decision-makers, and thanks to the creation of the so-called “zone 
Franc” (Bayart, 1995; Hugon, 2007). This expression identifies an area currently formed 
by 14 African countries that adopted the CFA Franc as their common currency. The 
CFA Franc exchange rate and value was directly linked to the French Franc – now to 
the Euro – implicitly determining a condition of strong monetary and economic 
dependence of these states vis-à-vis France (Conte, 1994; Hibou, 1995; Hugon, 2007).  
Taken together, cultural and economic policies implemented by France led to the 
creation of a hierarchical system of power, open to the participation of a narrow group 
of actors formed by a part of the French and African political and economic elites. 
Consequently, French policies towards Francophone Africa were implemented through 
a unique mix of informality, personalisation, secrecy and sometimes even illegality, 
which blurred the lines between national, partisan and private interests, and made it 
extremely difficult to distinguish the role and legitimacy of the different actors involved. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that this whole system of policy-making was planned, 
structured and implemented by French officials, following the direct order of De Gaulle 
– and his successors – and his nearest advisors, and it seems safe to argue that, at least 
in its essential features, it has not changed since then. 
Starting from decolonization, the main French institutions officially in charge of 
relations with the African continent were the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry 
of Defence, and until 1999, the Ministry of Cooperation.5 However, in accordance with 
the desire of General de Gaulle and his inner circle, Africa has always been considered a 
domaine reservé of the French presidency. This means that the president should have the 
last word on all the most important decisions concerning Africa, that he runs a personal 
diplomacy vis-à-vis other heads of state, and even more importantly, that he can take 
authoritative decisions without consulting or even informing his ministries (Lavroff, 
1997; Kessler, 1999), bypassing the formal chain of institutional delegation and directly 
activating the state’s resources and officials.  
Central for the creation of this parallel system of policy-making was Jacques 
Foccart, former businessman and Resistance fighter, leader of the Gaullist militia SAC 
(Service d’Action Civique)—a sort of shadow police force in France between the 1960s 
and 1980s (see further below)—and one of De Gaulle’s closer collaborators (Péan, 1990; 
Gaillard and Foccart, 1995, 1997).6 In 1961 Foccart was appointed Head of the General 
                                                            
5 A significant reform of  the French foreign policy apparatus was approved at the end of  the 1990s, leading to the 
merging of  the Ministry of  Cooperation – the so-called “Ministry for Africa” – with the Ministry of  Foreign 
Affairs (Moncrieff, 2004).  
6 The system of  power and decision-making created by and around Jacques Foccart has been described by Foccart 
himself  in the two-volume biography he edited in 1995-1997 with the journalist Philippe Gaillard. Even if  most 
experts and observers remarked that this biography conceals certain essential information and tends to reduce, 
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Secretariat for African and Malagasy Affairs (Secrétariat Général pour les Affaires 
Africaines et Malgache, also known as the Cellule Afrique), a state agency directly attached 
to the presidency,7 and in charge of African affairs. Following a suggestion made by 
Foccart himself, the FrançAfrique system was based on two main pillars, namely the 
everyday and direct access of Foccart to the president, and the personal connections 
created by the secretary with several African leaders and French actors: state officials, 
businessmen, members of the army and of the secret service, and other “greyer” subjects 
(Gaillard and Foccart, 1995, 1997; Péan, 1990, 2014). 
As resumed by Stephen Smith and Antoine Glaser (1997: 10-11), two 
investigative journalists who dedicated most of their careers to French activities in 
Africa: 
 
Foccart’s networks – which were born out of the common experience [of 
membership] in France Libre [the French Resistance during the Second World 
War] – were highly personalized and characterised by political alliances and a 
fully Gaullist loyalty. They were born in a sort of limbo concerning their 
legality; maybe they were legitimate, but at the same time they were clandestine; 
they were strong, resistant, and sometimes criminal in nature [...] Maybe we 
should call it the Réseau [Network]: all the Gaullist intermediaries in all sectors 
who, “beyond official hierarchy”, work for their “historical leader” and his 
“mission” [...] using the state as a means (authors’ translation). 
 
This original Réseau survived until the end of the Pompidou presidency (1974), and 
played an informal but important—and for a long time unknown—role in the various 
crises and events which punctuated the African political landscape in the decade after 
decolonization, including the Biafran secession, the Communist upsurge in Cameroon 
and the transition to power of Omar Bongo in Gabon (Verschave,8 1998; Vaïsse, 2009; 
Domergue, Tatsita and Deltombe, 2011). Generally speaking, members of Foccart’s 
network were involved in most of the political, economic and diplomatic exchanges 
concerning France and its most important African “clients”. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
justify or reevaluate Foccart’s actions, it remains a useful and direct source that can be critically employed by 
researchers aiming to describe and understand the FrançAfrique system. On the other hand, in this article we make 
reference to different works by Pierre Péan, an important investigative journalist and activist who has worked on 
Franco-African relations for decades. In this case too we have adopted a cautious approach, and critically evaluated 
and triangulated the information contained in Péan’s books as much as possible.     
7 The Headquarters of  the General Secretariat were located - and still are, even if  the agency has changed its 
name since then – in 2 Rue de l’Elysée, in the building next to the Palais de l’Elysée. 
8 As mentioned previously, François-Xavier Verschave was an economist and activist who published extensively on 
Franco-African relations. Because of  his double role of  critical witness and actor in FrançAfrique, we applied to his 
works the same principle of  caution as mentioned with regard to Pierre Péan and Jacques Foccart. 
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The unity and ideological cohesion of the network were weakened, after 
Pompidou’s death, by the choice made by the new president Giscard d’Estaing to 
substitute Foccart with René Journiac as chief of the Cellule Afrique. From this moment 
onwards, Franco-African relations began to be steered and managed by different and 
partly competing networks, linked to different political patrons, corporations and 
organisations. In this sense, Charles Pasqua,  Gaullist Minister of the Interior in 1986-
1988 and again in 1993-1995, and Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, son of President 
Mitterrand and advisor for African affairs between 1983 and 1992, are two clear 
examples of political entrepreneurs, who exploited their political, positional, relational 
and material resources to create personal and partly autonomous networks that could 
influence Franco-African relations (Smith and Glaser, 1994, 1997). At the same time, 
some of the nodal positions within the Franco-African network, and more generally the 
operational principles dictated by Foccart, continued to inspire French policies towards 
the continent during the following decades. An indirect confirmation of the resilience of 
this approach to foreign policy came from the so-called Affaire Elf.9 During the trial, 
which took place in 2002-3, the former CEO of Elf-Aquitaine, Loïk Le Floch-Prigent, 
gave this description of the mission and role of Elf within the Franco-African system: 
 
The system was created by General De Gaulle; Elf is not only an oil company, 
but it is a parallel diplomacy aiming to preserve the French control over African 
states at the moment of their decolonization. [...] Let’s call things by their 
name. Elf was created for keeping Algeria and the negro kings under France’s 
sphere of influence [...]. With the Algerians it failed, but with the negro kings it 
is still working. The system was created for favouring this opacity; the president 
of Elf is a second Minister of Cooperation. This is why General De Gaulle, with 
his shadow man Foccart, appointed an important member of the secret services 
to the head [of the enterprise], and this is why Elf always financed the secret 
services. Elf had three goals: diplomatic, political, and industrial (Lambert and 
Verschave, 2006, p. 82). 
 
On this basis, it seems fair to suggest that FrançAfrique was for a long time a clear 
example of a state racket. In this sense, racket theory not only accounts for the system 
of foreign policy implemented by France in Africa, but also captures an evolving feature 
of the state in Africa. As claimed by Bayart, Hibou and Ellis (1997), new forms of 
“criminal” governmentalities developed on the continent, legitimizing the presence and 
                                                            
9 By the Affaire Elf  we refer to a politico-financial scandal, uncovered in the middle of  the 1990s, which revealed 
the existence of  a complex system of  corruption and misappropriation of  funds, involving French officials and 
politicians, captains of  industry, the secret services and African elites and head of  states, all linked to Elf-
Aquitaine, a French oil company operating primarily in Africa.  
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the implementation in the public space of actors and practices which previously 
belonged to the informal, illegal, or even criminal domains. Through these lenses it 
becomes possible to better understand the role of criminal and/or grey organizations 
within African systems of governance and power management, such as the Corsican 
“Mafia” or entrepreneurs from the Lebanese diaspora, as part of a process of 
institutional and practical transformation and rejuvenation affecting the African states.  
However, the question of whether the term FrançAfrique, interpreted both as a 
system of domination and as a variety of (informal and personalised) foreign policy, is 
still able to capture and define the evolutions of Franco-African relations during the last 
twenty years, remains a matter of debate among experts and scholars (Banégas, Marchal 
and Meimon, 2007; Bayart, 2011; Leboeuf and Quénot-Suarez, 2014). Nevertheless, for 
the purpose of this work, we claim that the FrançAfrique system is also a crucial 
framework for exploring and assessing the role of Corsican mobsters within Franco-
African relations. In what follows, therefore, we provide an overview of how Corsican 
criminal organisations have been coopted as informal actors of the French political 
system, and we then focus on some key actors who represent the connecting points 
between the Corsican “Mafia”, the French state and African elites.  
 
When FrançAfrique Meets Corsican Interests 
 
Africa has been a central field of French politics throughout the Fifth Republic. As 
mentioned previously, however, Franco-African affairs are based on a series of networks 
of strong ties (Granovetter, 1973), characterized by a high reciprocity of exchanges 
among actors which appear to resist, over a medium-long period of time, the evolution 
of the juridical and political structures in which they have been created. Accordingly, in 
this part of the paper we devote our attention to two networks, namely the Pasqua and 
the Sarkozy networks. Both of these are tied to the Gaullist party, and originated in the 
initial network created by Jacques Foccart. Moreover, the Pasqua and the Sarkozy 
networks—with the latter in part an evolution of the former—emerged and developed 
during a period of generational and political transition, characterized by a series of 
conflicts and ruptures which revealed, briefly, at least a part of their members and the 
connections with personalities of the Corsican criminal scene. Thus, these two cases 
allow us to shed a preliminary light on the structure and functioning of CorsAfrique, by 
introducing some of its most important representatives.  
 
The 1990s and the New Game in Town  
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By the end of the 1990s, the balance of power between the French government and 
African leaders had progressively reversed, thanks in particular to the work of Omar 
Bongo, President of Gabon who, in the 2000s was viewed as the dominus of FrançAfrique, 
as well as Robert Bourgi, a business lawyer in a filial relationship with Jacques Foccart 
and spokesperson for the various African heads of state in Paris. The reversal in the 
balance of power seemed to concern the overall relationship between politics and 
economics in the 1990s. In fact, French politicians have played a critical role since the 
2000s in supporting the expansion of French companies in Africa: companies such as 
Bouygues, Bolloré and Areva occupy the leading role in African procurements thanks to 
the personal commitment of Nicolas Sarkozy as well (a long-time friend of both Martin 
Bouygues and Vincent Bollorè) and the afore-mentioned Robert Bourgi. The former 
President of the Republic denies having received any electoral funding from African 
countries. However, interestingly, during the closing ceremony of the 2006 primaries, 
after Sarkozy’s victory over Dominique de Villepin, Pascaline Bongo (Omar’s daughter) 
was indeed seated in the front rows, among the sponsors and the Gabonese Minister of 
Finance. As well as this, it seems relevant to note that one of the first measures taken by 
President Sarkozy was a 20% reduction in Gabon’s foreign debt (Harel and Hofnung, 
2011). Moreover, Omar Bongo managed to remove Jean-Marie Bockel from the 
Secretary of State of Cooperation, who was succeeded by Alain Joyandet, a personal 
friend of both Nicolas Sarkozy and Claude Guéant. 
Within this renewed framework, where personal ties influence political as well as 
economic careers, the networks built by the long-standing friendships of a few political 
leaders, both French and African, mostly linked to the Gaullist formations, proved to be 
precious. In this sense, the Corsican communities in Africa, from which the term 
CorsAfrique is coined, are an informative case. In fact, the share of Corsicans among 
French settlers is historically very important, particularly in Gabon, where the 
Corsicans were already over-represented in the first half of the century (Profizi, 2016).  
 
Pasqua, Tomi and Feliciaggi: The Three Men behind the Renewal of CorsAfrique 
 
The generational renewal of the Corsican community in Gabon was specifically built on 
the gambling enterprises that Michel Tomi and Robert Feliciaggi opened in several 
African countries. Among these was the Republic of Congo, where they managed to 
strengthen ties with President Denis Sassou-Nguesso thanks to the longstanding 
friendship, cultivated while attending the same French schools, between him and Robert 
Feliciaggi.   
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Both Tomi and Feliciaggi made their careers in the world of gambling, but Tomi, 
considered one of the key treasurers of the Corsican gangs, has risen to the headlines 
only recently. In particular, on the basis of the judicial acts of investigations still in 
progress, the French investigative newspapers Médiapart and Le Monde have not 
hesitated to present him as the “godfather of godfathers” (parrain des parrains) (Davet 
and Lhomme, 2014). Also underlined is his affiliation to the so called “external 
Corsicans” (corses de l'extérieur), and more particularly to the Corsican groups of the 
Hauts-de-Seine, the department in which the financial district of  La Defense, as well as 
some of the richest municipalities of France (Neuilly-sur-Seine, Levallois-Perret and 
others), are located. These Corsican groups, who brandish corsitude as an element of 
their French identity, have been presented as one of the main gears of the Gaullist 
political machine (Merton, 1997). Other than that, in Africa they have actively 
participated in the creation of what Sciarrone (2011) would call a “grey area” in the local 
administrative apparatus, allowing French companies to cultivate their own interests. 
This same grey area remains particularly complex to identify on judicial grounds: at 
around the time the initial draft of this article was completed, the conclusion of judicial 
proceedings against Michel Tomi was announced, resulting in a light sentence thanks to 
the “comparution sur reconnaissance préalable de culpabilité (CRPC)” which allows the 
defendant, by pleading guilty to some charges, to avoid taking the trial to court. This 
procedure was also possible because prosecutors were unable to characterize with 
precision some of the crimes he was alleged to have committed (Piel, 2018). 
On the institutional side, the figure of Charles Pasqua, Foccart’s associate for 
years and member of all Gaullist formations until the 1990s, when he finally detached 
himself from the movement following political and personal disagreements with Jacques 
Chirac, seems to be particularly relevant. Pasqua’s biography offers several pieces of 
information concerning the structuring, the functioning and the evolution of the 
Franco-Corsican-African réseaux. 
Alongside his political career, Pasqua also worked in Marseille as a 
representative of the Ricard10 commercial company, and participated in the foundation 
of the afore-mentioned SAC in 1959, remaining a key personality within it until the 
organisation’s dissolution in 1981. Directed by Pierre Debizet and overseen by Jacques 
Foccart, for many years the SAC functioned, in many instances, as a security service 
dedicated primarily to the safety of General De Gaulle. It was also involved, however, in 
                                                            
10 The history of  the Ricard company today appears particularly worthy of  interest, insofar as its representative in 
Montreal was Jean Venturi, a member of  the SAC, brother of  Dominique (known as Nick), the cornerstone of  the 
North American heroin distribution network for the first French Connection (Auda, 2005). One of  the follow-ups 
to this article could be an in-depth study of  the role played by the Ricard company in French foreign policy. 
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several violent incidents during the 1960s, especially against trade unionists, as well as 
some criminal episodes. According to many testimonies, including that of one of the 
robbers (Vidal, 2011), the famous robbery at a Strasbourg post office on 30 June 1971, in 
which robbers stole 11.5 million francs,11 was carried out specifically to finance the SAC, 
and more generally the party.  
It is also relatively well known that several professional criminals were among 
the members of the SAC. Among these was Jo Renucci, key figure of the Réseau 
méditerranée (Auda, 2005) and regular correspondent of Lucky Luciano in Naples, and 
his colleague and “heir” Marcel Francisci (Chairoff, 1975), investigated by American and 
French authorities as one of the leaders of a heroin trafficking operation to the United 
States; although the investigation did not result in a conviction, based on subsequent 
information, his involvement seems quite likely (Follorou and Nouzille, 2004). Francisci 
had also been a provincial and then a regional councillor in Corsica, and regional 
secretary of the party Rally for the Republic (Rassemblement pour la République – RPR), as 
well as friend of Pasqua and director of the Cercle de jeux Hausmann12 until his murder in 
1982 (Pierrat, 2003). However, despite the alleged membership privileges claimed by 
many SAC members (Colombié and Diaz, 2015), historians are more cautious about the 
real impunity guaranteed by the RPR to SAC members (Audigier, 2003). Nonetheless, it 
is safe to argue that the very existence of the SAC was accompanied by controversy and 
suspicion from its formal birth until its dissolution, which followed the socialists’ arrival 
in government in the spring of 1981 and the Auriol massacre13 a few months later. The 
parliamentary committee of inquiry named after the massacre violated the code of 
silence of its members (Audigier, 2003; Collombat, 2007) without, however, digging 
very deeply, probably due to the new government’s interest in preserving access to the 
FrançAfrique networks. This order service therefore appears to be a form of French 
“deep state” (Marchant, 2016), i.e. a state factory dedicated to illegal (or at least 
unpopular) activities, justified, nonetheless, by the national interest. 
Interestingly, throughout his entire political career Pasqua was at the centre of 
various political-criminal scandals involving a series of members of the Corsican 
                                                            
11 This corresponds to just under 12 million euros in 2017; the conversion was made using the online converter of  
the INSEE, available at https://www.insee.fr/fr/information/2417794 
12 In France, the only cities authorised to open casinos are those considered to be tourist cities. Therefore, in the 
Paris region, the only casino is Enghien-les-Bains, a spa town in the Val d'Oise in the northern suburbs of  Paris. 
However, some “Gaming Circles” registered as non-profit charities were created as places where it was possible to 
play poker, baccarat, and roulette. Historically considered to be banks of  Corsican organized crime, these circles 
were almost all closed between 2010 and 2016. See https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/paris-ile-de-
france/paris/cercles-jeu-paris-gros-histoires-troubles-1464941.html 
13 In an internal settling of  scores within the SAC, the entire family of  the provincial head of  the organization, the 
brigadier Jacques Massié, was killed on the night between 18 and 19 July 1981. 
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underworld. Despite his acquittal in the majority of the trials to which he was subjected, 
he was recognized as one of the protagonists in the events related to the casino of 
Annemasse. In April 2010 Pasqua was sentenced to 18 months on parole for “illegal 
financing” the party. According to the charges, in 1994 Pasqua, as Minister of the 
Interior, facilitated the opening of a casino in Annemasse, of which Michel Tomi was 
one of the owners together with Feliciaggi. Sold after a year, the pair made a profit of 
about 15 million euros. According to the judges, it was from these earnings that Tomi’s 
daughter (Marthe Mondoloni) paid about 1.25 million euros to the RPR to finance its 
1999 European election campaign, despite the initial declaration that the funds were 
granted by another company owned by the duo, the Congolaise de Gestion de Loterie 
(COGELO).  
Overall, Pasqua—and subsequently Sarkozy—represented the political 
components of the system. More specific attention will now be addressed to Michel 
Tomi, the character who epitomises the more recent development of CorsAfrique. 
 
From Paris to Africa: Michel Tomi, Gambling Emperor 
 
Michel Tomi, born in Algiers in 1947 to a family native to Tasso in the upper Taravo, 
began working in the gambling industry at the end of the 1960s. After starting out as a 
croupier in Monaco, he was employed in Marcel Francisci’s Cercle de jeux Haussmann, 
then in Jean-Dominique Fratoni’s Ruhl. In the 1980s he started running Bandol’s 
casino, together with his brother Jean (mayor of Tasso) and Robert Feliciaggi; however, 
the casino was closed down following a number of financial scandals (Follorou, 2014). 
Again with Robert Feliciaggi, owner of the Fortune’s Clubs in Congo, Tomi opened the 
Senegal PMU in the early 1990s. While broadcasting horse races in France on TV, they 
allowed African gamblers to bet on those same races. Over the years, they also opened 
branches in a large part of Western and Equatorial French Africa, particularly in 
Cameroon, Congo, Gabon and Mali.  
The suspicion of the investigators, however, was that these companies also 
served as a means to launder the proceeds of criminal activities, especially those linked 
to a fellow countryman of Robert Feliciaggi: Jean-Jé Colonna, considered the boss of 
Southern Corsica. Jean-Jé was alleged to have played a key role in Robert’s election as 
mayor of Pila-Canale, although this has never been proven (Le Monde, 2006). In fact, 
Tomi and Feliciaggi’s African networks and companies appeared primarily to be bases 
arrière of Corsican criminal organisations, whose members in some cases took refuge to 
escape vendettas or arrests. Such a role was possible not only because of the ability of 
Tomi and Feliciaggi to build relationships of exchange with African political leaders 
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through shared social circles in local capitals, but also because of the participation of 
some senior officials (diplomatic or police) directly linked to Pasqua, then pro-Sarkozy 
components within the UMP. One of the enigmas concerned the precise relationship 
between Pasqua and Sarkozy. Although the latter undoubtedly benefited from the 
networks of the former, it seems inaccurate to consider him as a simple heir, as their 
relationship after 1983 appeared to be characterized more by mutual necessity than by 
trust. The choice of Sarkozy, once he had become President of the Republic, to dissolve 
the so-called “African Cell” and to appoint Claude Guéant as “Advisor for Africa” was 
arguably representative of this tendency.  
In such a context, the presence of actors such as Michel Tomi allowed the French 
state to secure intermediaries that could be solicited in the commercial field, avoiding 
any direct involvement. Besides, these intermediaries could participate in electoral 
campaigns, as in the case of Tomi and Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, President of Mali, a kind 
of exchange that, some authors have suggested (Beau, 2014), was also at the basis of 
Francois Hollande and Laurent Fabius’ management of the Malian crisis.  
If we consider FrançAfrique as a system of exchange based on personal 
relationships, the friendship between Feliciaggi and Sassou-Nguesso or that between 
Tomi and Keita are thus particularly interesting as hub of several important businesses. 
Intercepted telephone calls, published by Médiapart from the proceedings against Michel 
Tomi, have shed light on a series of favours made by Tomi to Keita, including yachts, 
private medical visits, jackets, watches and trips (Arfi and Salvi, 2015a). According to 
the magistrates, these favours were expected to gain economic advantages for the 
companies of the Kabi group, Tomi’s holding company, which groups together most of 
his companies in Gabon and Mali (Carayol, 2015). 
These intimate relationships with Presidents Bongo and Keita, described by 
Tomi as family members, seem to have been useful to other French companies related to 
the UMP galaxy of Hauts-de-Seine, along with the Pasqua network. In fact, it was also 
and above all thanks to the mediation of Michel Tomi that the company Gallice 
Protection obtained a training assignment for the presidential guard of Mali. It has been 
revealed that the founder of Gallice, Frederic Gallois, who was also former commander 
of the National Gendarmerie Intervention Group (GIGN), reached Tomi through 
Bernard Squarcini (Arfi and Salvi, 2015b). On a concluding note, although any clear 
account of the functionality of these non-state actors in Franco-African politics remains 
difficult to retrace and demonstrate, Tomi and Feliciaggi’s proximity to crucial political 
actors both in France and in Africa indicate that the forms of political control exercised 
through informal channels remained active at least until Sarkozy’s presidency. In other 
words, the political and criminal ties demonstrated by judicial inquiries concerning the 
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implementation of French forms of control over a foreign territory, seem to confirm 
how the grey area of business between state actors and non-state actors might actually 
be relevant to make sense of certain aspects of foreign policy. 
 
Some (Preliminary) Conclusions 
 
In this article, we presented an initial account of the complex and frequently 
underestimated relational system of exchange, cooptation, collaboration and domination 
that has historically involved French political and economic elites, African ruling classes 
and some exponents of Corsican organised crime. By focusing on the way personal and 
social connections among French politicians and part of the Corsican underworld have 
contributed to and perpetrated a form of political domination that we have called 
CorsAfrique, the article expected to shed some fresh light on a surprisingly understudied 
case within the larger system of FrançAfrique. Although this work concentrates on a few 
specific actors and a particular period of time, we argue that the entirety of the French 
Fifth Republic has been punctuated by episodes and inquests suggesting that this 
structure has not been a contingent and deviant phenomenon, but rather an essential 
feature of French policy towards Africa. This appears to be even more substantial given 
that the overall FrançAfrique can be considered a type of foreign policy whose main 
characteristics and principles have barely been tackled by the scholarly literature. 
Specifically, the contribution this article has made to the existing scholarship is twofold. 
Theoretically, we found the “racket theory” (Stirk, 1992; Heins, 2007; Brocling, 2014) to 
be particularly insightful when considering the role of non-state actors (NSAs) as 
“proxy actors” in the development of foreign policies (Held and Koenig-Archibugi, 2003; 
Dingwerth and Pattberg, 2006; Ougaard and Leander, 2010; Baumann and Stengel, 
2014; Marchetti, 2016). The concept of “racket”, understood as a system of management 
based on a blurring dynamic between the “legal” and the “illegal”, has been particularly 
useful to make sense of France’s informal approach to control political dynamics in 
former colonies through the Corsican “Mafia”. This article, however, also contributed 
empirically by exploring the interrelations between actors like Jacques Foccart, Charles 
Pasqua, Michel Tomi and Robert Feliciaggi. By relying on the analysis of secondary 
sources and journalistic investigations on court proceedings concerning the connections 
between the French political arena and exponents of the Corsican “Mafia” in Africa, we 
have pursued a double objective. Firstly, we suggested that all these subjects belong to a 
system that has been defined by a common perception concerning the idea of acting for a 
common mission, namely, pursuing the national interest in Gaullist terms. Moreover, 
within this system an informal but clear distribution of roles and resources has been 
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fixed and maintained over the decades. Starting from this assumption, we challenged a 
certain definition of FrançAfrique, which tends to see Franco-African relations as an 
exception created by contingent and predatory factors. Relying on “racket theory”, we 
suggested instead that the inclusion of Corsican mobsters as informal members of the 
French foreign policy community resulted from a rational choice made by decision-
makers who interpreted their own interests and visions as a general and shared interest.  
Consequently, we aim to make a claim for further research able to push the 
analysis a step further, by also taking into consideration the impact of the changes that 
have occurred in the international distribution of power with time. While the lack of 
available public information on the topic has limited the possibilities of this article, we 
have provided a new and necessary contribution, which, we trust, will open new avenues 
of research on this subject.  
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